From Resolve Uganda
"History of the Conflict." Resolve Uganda 29 May 2010 http://www.resolveuganda.org/history
"For over two decades the LRA has terrorized communities throughout central Africa, causing one of the longest, most violent conflicts on the continent. The complex history of the region is at the root of both the longevity and magnitude of the crisis. The failure to take into account this historical complexity has resulted in inadequate and ineffective responses from leaders, both in Uganda and the international community.
The crisis in northern Uganda is essentially two conflicts in one: first, the fighting of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which was initially waging war against the Ugandan government and terrorizing the civilian population in the north; and second, the deep grievances of northern Ugandans against the existing government. The war arose out of the divisive political climate that was embedded by British colonialism and perpetuated by post-colonial politics. The British employed a "divide-and-rule" strategy, pitting southerners against northerners to maintain control. Since gaining independence in 1962, Ugandan politics have been marked by continued tribal and regional divisions, most poignantly the North-South divide. In addition, armed rebellion was widely accepted as the sole and legitimate means to express political grievances and attain political power. Repression and violence, not limited to the notorious reign of Idi Amin, has been a constant feature of the Ugandan political system.
Since President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) took power by military coup in 1986, at least 22 groups have taken up arms against the government. The most significant of these rebellions has taken place in four stages in northern Uganda, especially in the sub-Acholi region. When Museveni captured power in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, he was violating the December 1985 Nairobi Peace Accord, a power-sharing agreement that he had signed with General Tito Okello, a northerner. Fearing repression, northerners in Kampala fled north once the NRA arrived. Museveni discharged all northerners in the civil service and military, ordering the NRA to pursue these elements. In the Acholi sub-region, there was fear and panic as many thought the NRA would take revenge on northerners, whom they blamed for much of Uganda's violent history.
In this climate of mistrust, the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) organized itself in southern Sudan to defend the north against the NRA. Initially, the UPDA consisted of former government soldiers and disillusioned, unemployed young men from northern Uganda. The UPDA received strong support from the local population. However, the success of the UPDA was limited, and by July 1987, many UPDA soldiers accepted an offer of amnesty from the NRA. In June 1988, peace talks between the NRA and UPDA led to the Gulu Peace Accord, in which more than two thousand UPDA soldiers were incorporated into the national military.
While the UPDA faded, another rebellion of a different nature grew under the leadership of Alice Auma Lakwena. Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) was founded to "purify" Acholi society and liberate the north from the NRA control. Lakwena was believed to be a spiritual messenger with mystical powers. The HSM, like the UPDA, received strong support from the northern population. Yet, after winning a series of battles, HSM was overwhelmingly defeated by the NRA in November 1987. Following Lakwena's defeat, her father, Severino Lukoya continued to fight, claiming that he was also a spiritual messenger. His rebellion failed to win the support of the public, and quickly dissolved.
The defeat of these three rebellion movements left a power vacuum in northern Uganda that was immediately filled by Joseph Kony. Kony, a former UPDA fighter, was a simple Catholic preacher and a teacher and during his time with the UPDA, he claimed to have become a spiritual messenger in the tradition of Lakwena. Kony refused to recognize the Gulu Peace Accord of 1988, and split off to form the Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army. The name was later changed to Uganda Christian Democratic Army, and finally in late 1991 to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which remains its name to this day. Since its founding in 1988, the LRA has combined an apocalyptic spiritualism with opportunistic politics and warlordism. Receiving little support from the war-weary northern population, Kony's group began attacking local civilians.
The Ugandan government has generally adopted a military posture towards the LRA rebellion, arguing that a "military solution" is the only way to defeat the rebels. Yet, military approaches have repeatedly failed to end the conflict and have instead contributed to mortality in the region and devastated an entire society. In 1993, Betty Bigombe, then Minister for the Pacification of the North, led peace negotiations between the Government and the LRA. The talks were reportedly within hours of completion when President Museveni issued a seven-day ultimatum for the rebels to surrender. The peace process collapsed. Since then, the Community of Sant'Egidio of Rome, the Carter Center in the United States and the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Uganda has organized other mediation initiatives. However, these efforts have all been plagued by ill will and mistrust by both warring parties and none have succeeded. In 2002, the government launched a new military offensive against the LRA, Operation Iron Fist, causing the rebels to move into the Lango and Teso regions of northern Uganda.
Operation Iron First also caused a dramatic surge in the number of internally displaced persons in northern Uganda. In 1996, the Government had begun a policy of "protected villages," moving people from their homes into camps in an attempt to isolate LRA fighters. However, these "protected villages" quickly turned into a displacement nightmare. By 2004, 1.7 million people - over 80% of the region - were displaced in squalid camps lacking access to basic resources. Within these camps, problems of starvation, poor sanitation, psychosocial trauma, lack of education, HIV/AIDS and prostitution persist on gross levels. In 2005 reports revealed that nearly 1,000 people were dying each week as a result of camp conditions. Camp conditions are potent symbols of the exclusion and marginalization of northerners by the Museveni regime and have only exacerbated northern grievances against the government. Many in the camps believe the government is intentionally trying to kill them. Others believe that President Museveni is politically benefiting from the war and subsequent displacement by suppressing and disenfranchising the north, a possible stronghold for opposition parties.
The LRA, however, cannot claim to legitimately represent these northern grievances. In fact, the LRA has terrorized the local population. It has filled its ranks by abducting children, as many as 66,000 over the course of the war. Utilizing psychological warfare, the commanders are able to manipulate and terrify these children, forcing them to commit unspeakable atrocities. In some cases, they are forced to kill family members or burn their own villages to prove their obedience and entrench their fear. Abducted girls become the "wives" of the commanders, essentially sex slaves.
Despite its lack of popular support and brutal tactics, the LRA leadership has been able to sustain itself for over two decades. How is this possible? First, elusive terrain and porous regional borders allow the lightly equipped rebel group significant geographic mobility. Second, the LRA has not been hurt by a lack of popular support because it needs little manpower to carry out ambushes and raids on civilian targets, its preferred tactic. Third, and most significantly, the LRA benefited from regional rivalry throughout the 1990s. Beginning in 1994, the Government of Sudan, based in Khartoum, has provided military support and safe haven to the LRA. In exchange, Khartoum used the LRA to destabilize its southern region and fight the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). In retaliation, the Ugandan government funded the SPLA. The U.S., concerned about Khartoum's involvement in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in sub-Saharan Africa, also funneled weapons to the SPLA through the Ugandan government. The result was a massive flow of arms to the region. The 1999 Nairobi Agreement between Sudan and Uganda supposedly ended these proxy relationships. However, covert assistance still persists, particularly to the LRA from elements of the Sudanese armed forces.
Sudan's 21-year war came to an end in 2005 when the Sudanese government and SPLA signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. U.S. and international involvement was crucial to achieving a finalized settlement, which established southern Sudan's semi-autonomous status and provided for a 2011 referendum on secession. Following the agreement, the new southern government was eager consolidate its power and rebuild the war-torn region. However, the LRA's destabilizing presence made this difficult. Therefore, in 2006 the Government of South Sudan offered to mediate peace talks between the rebels and Ugandan government. Negotiations began in July 2006 and were widely believed to be the best opportunity to end the war.
In 2005 the conflict took a dramatic turn, as the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Kony and top LRA commanders on charges including war crimes, and the rebels began pulling out of Uganda and establishing bases in the DR Congo. The next year the Ugandan government and LRA began peace talks, which culminated in a final agreement in April 2008. However, the peace process had failed to gain the buy-in of LRA leader Joseph Kony, who refused to sign the agreement and began consolidating his forces in the DR Congo.
Despite continued efforts to convince Kony to sign the agreement, the LRA leader ordered his army to begin preparing for a new round of violence. In September 2008 he unleashed his fighters on communities in northeastern Congo, abducting hundreds of children and taking control of an area the size of Connecticut.
In December 2008 a Ugandan-led military offensive against the LRA’s Congolese bases caused a dramatic escalation of violence. The poorly planned offensive failed to surprise the elusive rebel leaders, who responded by ordering massive reprisal attacks on civilians in vulnerable areas of the DR Congo and Sudan. In the space of a few short months, the LRA killed over 850 innocent people and displaced hundreds of thousands more. In March of 2009, the Ugandan army ended its offensive after failing to capture top LRA commanders, who continue to order attacks against communities in the region."
"History of the Conflict." Resolve Uganda 29 May 2010 http://www.resolveuganda.org/history
"For over two decades the LRA has terrorized communities throughout central Africa, causing one of the longest, most violent conflicts on the continent. The complex history of the region is at the root of both the longevity and magnitude of the crisis. The failure to take into account this historical complexity has resulted in inadequate and ineffective responses from leaders, both in Uganda and the international community.
The crisis in northern Uganda is essentially two conflicts in one: first, the fighting of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which was initially waging war against the Ugandan government and terrorizing the civilian population in the north; and second, the deep grievances of northern Ugandans against the existing government. The war arose out of the divisive political climate that was embedded by British colonialism and perpetuated by post-colonial politics. The British employed a "divide-and-rule" strategy, pitting southerners against northerners to maintain control. Since gaining independence in 1962, Ugandan politics have been marked by continued tribal and regional divisions, most poignantly the North-South divide. In addition, armed rebellion was widely accepted as the sole and legitimate means to express political grievances and attain political power. Repression and violence, not limited to the notorious reign of Idi Amin, has been a constant feature of the Ugandan political system.
Since President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) took power by military coup in 1986, at least 22 groups have taken up arms against the government. The most significant of these rebellions has taken place in four stages in northern Uganda, especially in the sub-Acholi region. When Museveni captured power in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, he was violating the December 1985 Nairobi Peace Accord, a power-sharing agreement that he had signed with General Tito Okello, a northerner. Fearing repression, northerners in Kampala fled north once the NRA arrived. Museveni discharged all northerners in the civil service and military, ordering the NRA to pursue these elements. In the Acholi sub-region, there was fear and panic as many thought the NRA would take revenge on northerners, whom they blamed for much of Uganda's violent history.
In this climate of mistrust, the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) organized itself in southern Sudan to defend the north against the NRA. Initially, the UPDA consisted of former government soldiers and disillusioned, unemployed young men from northern Uganda. The UPDA received strong support from the local population. However, the success of the UPDA was limited, and by July 1987, many UPDA soldiers accepted an offer of amnesty from the NRA. In June 1988, peace talks between the NRA and UPDA led to the Gulu Peace Accord, in which more than two thousand UPDA soldiers were incorporated into the national military.
While the UPDA faded, another rebellion of a different nature grew under the leadership of Alice Auma Lakwena. Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) was founded to "purify" Acholi society and liberate the north from the NRA control. Lakwena was believed to be a spiritual messenger with mystical powers. The HSM, like the UPDA, received strong support from the northern population. Yet, after winning a series of battles, HSM was overwhelmingly defeated by the NRA in November 1987. Following Lakwena's defeat, her father, Severino Lukoya continued to fight, claiming that he was also a spiritual messenger. His rebellion failed to win the support of the public, and quickly dissolved.
The defeat of these three rebellion movements left a power vacuum in northern Uganda that was immediately filled by Joseph Kony. Kony, a former UPDA fighter, was a simple Catholic preacher and a teacher and during his time with the UPDA, he claimed to have become a spiritual messenger in the tradition of Lakwena. Kony refused to recognize the Gulu Peace Accord of 1988, and split off to form the Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army. The name was later changed to Uganda Christian Democratic Army, and finally in late 1991 to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which remains its name to this day. Since its founding in 1988, the LRA has combined an apocalyptic spiritualism with opportunistic politics and warlordism. Receiving little support from the war-weary northern population, Kony's group began attacking local civilians.
The Ugandan government has generally adopted a military posture towards the LRA rebellion, arguing that a "military solution" is the only way to defeat the rebels. Yet, military approaches have repeatedly failed to end the conflict and have instead contributed to mortality in the region and devastated an entire society. In 1993, Betty Bigombe, then Minister for the Pacification of the North, led peace negotiations between the Government and the LRA. The talks were reportedly within hours of completion when President Museveni issued a seven-day ultimatum for the rebels to surrender. The peace process collapsed. Since then, the Community of Sant'Egidio of Rome, the Carter Center in the United States and the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative in Uganda has organized other mediation initiatives. However, these efforts have all been plagued by ill will and mistrust by both warring parties and none have succeeded. In 2002, the government launched a new military offensive against the LRA, Operation Iron Fist, causing the rebels to move into the Lango and Teso regions of northern Uganda.
Operation Iron First also caused a dramatic surge in the number of internally displaced persons in northern Uganda. In 1996, the Government had begun a policy of "protected villages," moving people from their homes into camps in an attempt to isolate LRA fighters. However, these "protected villages" quickly turned into a displacement nightmare. By 2004, 1.7 million people - over 80% of the region - were displaced in squalid camps lacking access to basic resources. Within these camps, problems of starvation, poor sanitation, psychosocial trauma, lack of education, HIV/AIDS and prostitution persist on gross levels. In 2005 reports revealed that nearly 1,000 people were dying each week as a result of camp conditions. Camp conditions are potent symbols of the exclusion and marginalization of northerners by the Museveni regime and have only exacerbated northern grievances against the government. Many in the camps believe the government is intentionally trying to kill them. Others believe that President Museveni is politically benefiting from the war and subsequent displacement by suppressing and disenfranchising the north, a possible stronghold for opposition parties.
The LRA, however, cannot claim to legitimately represent these northern grievances. In fact, the LRA has terrorized the local population. It has filled its ranks by abducting children, as many as 66,000 over the course of the war. Utilizing psychological warfare, the commanders are able to manipulate and terrify these children, forcing them to commit unspeakable atrocities. In some cases, they are forced to kill family members or burn their own villages to prove their obedience and entrench their fear. Abducted girls become the "wives" of the commanders, essentially sex slaves.
Despite its lack of popular support and brutal tactics, the LRA leadership has been able to sustain itself for over two decades. How is this possible? First, elusive terrain and porous regional borders allow the lightly equipped rebel group significant geographic mobility. Second, the LRA has not been hurt by a lack of popular support because it needs little manpower to carry out ambushes and raids on civilian targets, its preferred tactic. Third, and most significantly, the LRA benefited from regional rivalry throughout the 1990s. Beginning in 1994, the Government of Sudan, based in Khartoum, has provided military support and safe haven to the LRA. In exchange, Khartoum used the LRA to destabilize its southern region and fight the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). In retaliation, the Ugandan government funded the SPLA. The U.S., concerned about Khartoum's involvement in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in sub-Saharan Africa, also funneled weapons to the SPLA through the Ugandan government. The result was a massive flow of arms to the region. The 1999 Nairobi Agreement between Sudan and Uganda supposedly ended these proxy relationships. However, covert assistance still persists, particularly to the LRA from elements of the Sudanese armed forces.
Sudan's 21-year war came to an end in 2005 when the Sudanese government and SPLA signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. U.S. and international involvement was crucial to achieving a finalized settlement, which established southern Sudan's semi-autonomous status and provided for a 2011 referendum on secession. Following the agreement, the new southern government was eager consolidate its power and rebuild the war-torn region. However, the LRA's destabilizing presence made this difficult. Therefore, in 2006 the Government of South Sudan offered to mediate peace talks between the rebels and Ugandan government. Negotiations began in July 2006 and were widely believed to be the best opportunity to end the war.
In 2005 the conflict took a dramatic turn, as the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Kony and top LRA commanders on charges including war crimes, and the rebels began pulling out of Uganda and establishing bases in the DR Congo. The next year the Ugandan government and LRA began peace talks, which culminated in a final agreement in April 2008. However, the peace process had failed to gain the buy-in of LRA leader Joseph Kony, who refused to sign the agreement and began consolidating his forces in the DR Congo.
Despite continued efforts to convince Kony to sign the agreement, the LRA leader ordered his army to begin preparing for a new round of violence. In September 2008 he unleashed his fighters on communities in northeastern Congo, abducting hundreds of children and taking control of an area the size of Connecticut.
In December 2008 a Ugandan-led military offensive against the LRA’s Congolese bases caused a dramatic escalation of violence. The poorly planned offensive failed to surprise the elusive rebel leaders, who responded by ordering massive reprisal attacks on civilians in vulnerable areas of the DR Congo and Sudan. In the space of a few short months, the LRA killed over 850 innocent people and displaced hundreds of thousands more. In March of 2009, the Ugandan army ended its offensive after failing to capture top LRA commanders, who continue to order attacks against communities in the region."
